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The recent uprising in Iran, which started in the summer of 2009, 
has raised a number of major issues for debate in the international 
media and among politicians, academics and activists. This 
Development Viewpoint discusses the background to the uprising, 
its social composition and demands, and its implication for Iran and 
the region. In the process, it seeks to dispel some of the prevailing 
misconceptions about the nature of this mass movement.
The Background
Most analysts in the West portray Iran as a religiously conservative 
country, ignoring its momentous socio-economic transformations since 
the 1979 revolution. Especially during the 1990s and until today, Iran 
has undergone massive changes and has achieved substantial progress 
in human development. 
A few statistics are illustrative. Seventy per cent of the population is 
urbanized. Female life expectancy is 71 years while male life expectancy 
is 70. Contraceptive prevalence is 77%; and 65% of university students 
are women. The literacy rate is 85%, including a 89% rate in urban 
areas and a 75% rate in rural areas. As a result, a young, educated 
population has emerged to support a powerful democracy movement 
and challenge the very state that has brought about these impressive 
developments.
The slogan of the 1979 revolution was independence, freedom and 
justice. Independence was achieved with the overthrow of the Shah’s 
regime as the client state of the US. Under the Islamic Republic, the 
majority of the population has continued to struggle for freedom (for 
political inclusion and civil and individual liberties). But they do not 
regard Islam and modernity to be incompatible, or Islam to be inimical 
to personal freedoms. 
In this regard, it is misleading to view the Islamic state in Iran as either 
totalitarian or archaic. It is an authoritarian, patriarchal and ideologically 
exclusive system that exerts power through modern state institutions 
(Bayat 2009). Moreover, prominent ‘religious new thinkers’ who are 
influential members of the democracy movement believe that religion 
cannot be imposed on the will of the people. They believe, instead, that 
religion’s role in politics must be legitimized through popular support.
Such proponents are both inside and outside the system, and are 
often willing to ally with secularists, democratic nationalists and the 
left.  They have far broader grassroots support than other parts of the 
democracy movement. In this context they refuse to be dragged into 
endorsing binary opposites, such ‘the modern versus the traditional’ or 
‘the West versus Islam’. Hence, they reject the view that their movement 
is imitating or following Western culture.
During the Iran-Iraq war, the struggle for political inclusion and civil and
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individual liberties was shoved to the sideline. It was the movement for 
post-war reconstruction and development that revived the struggle for 
democracy. In the 1990s social pressure from below led to the Reformist 
government of Mohammad Khatami, and to a period of the expansion 
and empowerment of civil society organizations, the media and social 
activism. At this time, some of the elements within the reform movement 
began calling for a massive extension of democracy. 
Also during this same period, economic policies associated with neo-
liberalism, privatisation and the shrinking of the social welfare system 
intensified the level of both poverty and corruption. As a result, in 2005, 
the conservative candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who campaigned 
on an anti-poverty and anti-corruption platform, succeeded in becoming 
the president. However, after the election, poverty and corruption still 
increased, the privatisation process intensified, inflation soared to 25% 
and unemployment reached 10%. 
Government restrictions imposed on free press, free assembly and 
free speech created obstacles in the path of democracy activists. But 
the constant threat of war and sanctions from the West also served to 
intensify the level of domestic political repression.
The Nature of the Movement 
In the June 2009 election, President Ahmadinejad was allegedly re-
elected for a second term. As is well known, millions of protesters 
throughout the country challenged the election result. They wore green 
(‘the colour of Islam’) in support of Mir-Hossein Mousavi (the defeated 
candidate) (see Ansari 2009). In the street demonstrations, a number of 
people died, and thousands were injured and imprisoned. Leaders were 
tortured and forced to confess that they were conspiring with foreign 
powers.
Rally outside state TV station in Tehran on June 16, 2009
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But the democracy movement resolutely regards Iran’s independence 
as a hard-earned reality, which was achieved with great sacrifice as 
a result of the 1979 revolution. Foreign agents will not be allowed to 
manipulate the movement (Adib-Moghadam 2009). Indeed, many 
protesters displayed pictures of former Prime Minister Muhammad 
Mossadeq, arguing that they would not ‘let history repeat itself’. In other 
words, they wanted democracy but not any kind of foreign intervention, 
such as the 1953 British and US coup that overthrew the Mossadeq 
government.
Contrary to much speculation in the West, the protest movement is 
not based on an ‘urban modern secular middle class’, represented by 
Mousavi, which is pitted against ‘rural traditional religious working 
classes’, represented by the government. The democratic opposition and 
pro-government forces derive their support from both constituencies. 
Many people on both sides of the struggle have benefitted from state 
subsidies, state investments and the proceeds from oil income. But the 
majority is opposed to political repression and corruption. And they are 
supported, in fact, by a number of very influential clergy.
The Implications of the Movement 
With the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the Islamist 
movement that had played an important role in the overthrow of the 
Shah was transformed into a Shi’a government based on the theory 
of Velayat – e faqih (the Governance of the Jurist). However, from the 
early days of the government, Grand Ayatollahs, such as Mottahari and 
Montazeri, argued that religious theory and the religious community 
can be separated from politics and state authority. 
Following these two Grand Ayatollahs, well-known dissident clerics, 
journalists and educators, who represent the ‘religious new thinkers’, 
have recently challenged the ruling orthodoxy and advocated a 
separation of religious values and secular realities.
They believe that it is possible to bring about just Islamic governance, 
which would be similar to the regime in early Islam under the leadership 
of Imam Ali, the first Shi’a Imam. During this regime, justice and human 
rights were accorded special importance. The discourse of these Iranian 
clergy is similar to that of Grand Ayatollah Fadlallah, the spiritual leader 
of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq. 
These Shi’a Islamic clerics have revived the concept of ijtihad (which 
is meant to be a bridge between divine injunctions and the practical 
requirements of any particular time and place). This approach, which is 
crucial to formulating an Islamic interpretation of modern developments 
and circumstances, is shaping the discourse on democracy in the region.
The movement for democracy in Iran has repeatedly disassociated 
itself from the influence of Western governments, which it believes 
are more interested in opposing the Iranian nuclear programme and 
the country’s stance against Israel than in promoting democracy. In 
fact, the development of the country’s nuclear energy programme is 
widely supported by Iranians, even by those who are critical of their 
government. 
The opposition leaders in Iran do not favour dismantling the Islamic 
state; and they do not favour recognising the state of Israel or reducing 
Iran’s influence in the region. They also oppose Western sanctions 
because they can have catastrophic humanitarian consequences in Iran.
Any covert operations by intelligence agencies and external funding 
by Western governments for a so-called ‘velvet revolution’ will only 
serve to undermine the grassroots democratic movement in Iran. The 
future of democracy in Iran (as well as in the region) depends not only 
on challenging domestic repression but also on opposing imperial 
domination. The success of the democratic movement will also depend 
on overcoming the growing divide and misunderstanding between the 
West and the Muslim world.
This Development Viewpoint is based on Elaheh Rostami-Povey’s forthcoming 2010 book, Iran’s 
influence: A Religio-Political State in its Region and in the World, Zed Books.
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